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Abstract
Nowadays, peer-to-peer (P2P) streaming systems have become a popular way to
deliver multimedia content over the internet due to their low bandwidth require-
ment, high video streaming quality, and flexibility. However, P2P streaming sys-
tems are vulnerable to various attacks, especially pollution attacks, due to their
distributed and dynamically changing infrastructure. In this paper, by exploring
the features of various pollution attacks, we propose a trust management system
tailored for P2P streaming systems. Both direct trust and indirect trust are taken
into consideration when designing the trust management system. A new direct
trust model is proposed. A dynamic confidence factor that can dynamically adjust
the weight of direct and indirect trust in computing the trust is also proposed and
studied. A novel double-threshold trust utilization scheme is given. It is shown
that the proposed trust management system is effective in identifying polluters and
preventing them from further sharing of polluted data chunks.
Keywords: Peer-to-Peer Networks, Pollution Attack, Trust Management,
Multimedia Streaming.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Motivation
The past decade has witnessed the rising of large-scale multimedia social net-
works, over which millions of users interact with each other and exchange media
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contents in a distributed way. Among all the multimedia social network appli-
cations, peer-to-peer (P2P) streaming is popular and successful due to its high
scalability, robustness, and satisfactory performance. Currently, there are two cat-
egories of P2P streaming systems:tree-based [2, 3] and mesh-based [4, 5]. In
tree-based P2P streaming systems, the media content is encoded and divided into
small chunks by a root node, and is then distributed to his children nodes. Then,
these children nodes forward the received chunks to their children nodes. The data
chunks are not forwarded any further at the leaf nodes which reside at the bottom
of the tree. In mesh-based P2P streaming systems, the media content is encoded
and divided into small chunks by peers. Each peer maintains a buffer map an-
nouncing available and desirable chunks. Peers exchange their buffer maps, and
then upload or download data chunks according to their interests. Unlike the tree-
based systems, mesh-based systems do not need to build and maintain a fixed
streaming topology, and thus overcomes the bandwidth bottleneck problems ex-
isting in tree-based streaming systems. Today’s most popular P2P streaming ap-
plications, such as PPTV [6], PPStream [7], and SopCast [8], are all mesh-based
streaming systems.
In these P2P streaming networks, peers are assumed to be well behaved and
non-malicious. To the best of our knowledge, few of them are designed to be
resistant to pollution attacks. However, due to their distributed and dynamically
changing infrastructure, P2P streaming systems are vulnerable to various attacks,
especially pollution attacks. Malicious peers may intentionally forge data chunks
or alter received data chunks, and make these polluted data chunks available to
other peers. Without the ability to differentiate between malicious peers and good
peers, peers are highly likely to request and forward polluted data chunks, con-
sequently degrading the performance of the whole system. Therefore, effective
pollution-resistant mechanisms are badly needed for P2P streaming systems.
1.2. Related Work
A number of scholarly work has been published in literature on the design
of pollution-resistant mechanisms for P2P streaming systems. In [9], by measur-
ing the PPTV streaming system, the authors showed that without any pollution-
resistant mechanisms, the polluted content could spread through much of the P2P
network. Then, the authors proposed four possible defenses to pollution attack,
namely, blacklisting, traffic encryption, hash verification, and chunk signing. In
[10], the authors presented a framework to secure P2P media streaming systems
from malicious peers by utilizing a subset of trusted peers to monitor the band-
width usage of untrusted peers and throttle the malicious peers in the system.In
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[11], the authors investigated the scenario that polluters could upload polluted and
clean chunks alternatively to avoid being detected, and a trust management system
was then proposed to defend this kind of pollution attacks.
On the other hand, trust management mechanisms have been extensively stud-
ied in literature for a wide range of applications, such as electronics commerce
[12, 13, 14], ad-hoc networks [15, 16, 17], P2P networks [18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]. However, trust is in nature a complex psychologi-
cal concept involving a lot of complex properties, such as uncertainty, fuzziness,
asymmetry, and time attenuation. The methodology used to model the trust has a
significant influence on the performance of the trust management system. Trust
models should be tailored to meet the specific requirements of different P2P ap-
plications. In this paper, by exploiting the unique features of pollution attacks,
we design a trust management system to defend against various types of pollu-
tion attacks for P2P multimedia streaming systems. Two closely-related work are
[23] and [27]. In [23], the authors developed a fully distributed trust management
system named as PeerTrust. PeerTrust adopts the public-key infrastructure for
securing trust scores and uses overlay for trust propagation. In [27], the authors
proposed PowerTrust, which is a robust and scalable P2P reputation system. They
leverage the power-law feedback characteristics to build up a distributed reputa-
tion ranking system. PowerTrust can help peers to identify the most reputable
peers quickly and accurately. However, both PeerTrust and PowerTrust adopt a
fixed weight factor to balance the weight of direct and indirect trust, and use a
single-threshold approach to identify dishonest peers. Most importantly, the trust
models and the trust updates schemes adopted in PeerTrust and PowerTrust are
not tailored to fighting against pollution attacks.
1.3. Main Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows.
• A theoretic framework on the modeling of trust management systems to
fight against pollution attack in P2P streaming systems is proposed and in-
vestigated.
• A dynamic confidence factor is proposed to dynamically adjust the weight
of direct and indirect trust in computing the trust, which is shown to be
pretty effective in reducing the negative effects of the bad-mouthing attack
and the collusion attack. Guidelines on how to deign such a dynamic confi-
dence factor are given, and two specific designs of the dynamic confidence
factor are proposed and investigated.
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• A novel approach to model the direct trust is proposed based on the unique
features of pollution attacks. It is rigorously proved that the proposed trust
model is effective in defending against the on-off pollution attack intro-
duced in Section 4.3.
• A novel double threshold trust utilization scheme is proposed, which is
shown to better than the conventional single threshold trust utilization ap-
proach.
• The performance of the proposed trust management system is investigated
under various types of pollution attacks including bad-mouth attack, per-
sistent attack, on-off attack, and collaborative attack. It is shown that the
proposed trust management system is effective in defending against these
attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of
the design of our trust management mechanism. Section 3 describes the proposed
trust management system in detail. In Section 4, the performance of our trust
management system under various types of pollution attacks is analyzed. In Sec-
tion 5, several numerical examples are presented to validate the proposed studies.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. System Design Overview
In this paper, we consider a mesh-based P2P streaming network [2]–[5], where
all the peers can serve as the uploader and the downloader at the same time. In
the proposed system, the media content is encoded and divided into small chunks
by peers. Each peer maintains a buffer map announcing available and desirable
chunks. Peers exchange their buffer maps, and then upload or download data
chunks according to their interests. To defend against various potential attacks
that are commonly seen in existing P2P streaming networks, we introduce a trust
management system into the P2P streaming network. Under the proposed trust
management system, each peer builds up trust records of other peers based on their
previous direct transactions or recommendations from other peers. We refer to the
trust built on direct interacting experience as direct trust, and refer to the trust
built on recommendations from third party as indirect trust. A detail description
of direct trust and indirect trust is given in Section 3.
In our trust management system, we assume that there is no central database
to store the trust values of peers. Instead, the trust values are computed and stored
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Figure 1: System Model
at each peer itself. We assume there is a trust manager at each peer. One function
of the trust manager is to do real-time trust evaluation. To evaluate the trustwor-
thiness of a particular peer, a peer’s trust manager sends out the enquiries on the
trust values of the target peer to the peers that have direct transactions of both the
peer and the target peer. Then, the trust manager computes the trust value of the
target peer by doing a weighted sum of the direct trust and indirect trust values.
Another important function of the trust manager is to feedback submission. It is
responsible for providing recommendations on target peers when it receives trust
value enquires on target peers from other peers. The benefit of this assumption is
that the proposed trust management mechanism is fully distributed and does not
rely on a centralized server. Thus, it can be readily applied to P2P multimedia
streaming systems that have distributed structures.
In the proposed trust management system, we use Ti,j(t) to denote the trust
that user i has on user j at time t. A higher value of Ti,j indicates that user i has a
stronger belief that user j is trustworthy. The trust values are then used by the peer
to decide whether to interact with another peer or not. A peer will only send its
data request to the top K peers from all the peers having its desired data chunks
based on their trust values. Through this way, peers can reduce the possibility
of exposing themselves to malicious peers, and thus can protect themselves from
potential pollution attacks. This is illustrated in Fig. 1. Suppose that all the four
5
peers claim that they have the data chunks that peer i needs, and the trust values
of peer 2 and 3 at peer i are low, the trust values of peer 1 and 4 at peer i are high.
Then, peer i will only send data request to peer 1 and 4 that are trustworthy.
Detail descriptions of the design of the trust management system is given in
the following section.
Table 1: Notations and Definitions of Basic Terms
Notation Basic Definition
Ti,j Trust value of j evaluated by i
Di,j Direct trust value of j evaluated by i
Ii,j Indirect trust value of j evaluated by i
αi,j Dynamic confidence factor of i on j
Ni,j Number of transactions between i and j
N ci,j Number of clean chunks that j sent to i
Npi,j Number of polluted chunks that j sent to i
Si,j Set of peers that have transactions with i, j
Ci,k Credibility of k evaluated by i
Rk,j k’s recommendation value on j
λ Forgetting factor
µ Forgiving factor
θPi Threshold for detecting malicious peers
θGi Threshold for detecting good peers
3. Trust Management in P2P Streaming Networks
In our trust management system, we use Ti,j(t) to denote the trust that user
i has on user j at time t. The value of Ti,j is within the range [0, 1], with “0”
denoting distrust and “1” denoting fully trust. A higher value of Ti,j indicates that
user i has a stronger belief that user j will upload clean chunks.
Let Di,j(t) and Ii,j(t) denote the direct trust and indirect trust that user i has
on user j at time t, Ti,j(t) can then be computed as follows
Ti,j(t) = αi,jDi,j(t) + (1− αi,j)Ii,j(t), (1)
where 0 ≤ αi,j ≤ 1 is a parameter reflecting user i’s confidence of its direct trust
over user j. A larger value of αi,j indicates that user i is more confident of its own
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judgement of user j, while a smaller value of αi,j indicates that user i relies more
on other peers’ recommendation on user j.
In the following subsections, we give an in-depth description of each essential
component of the proposed trust management system, which includes the dynamic
confidence factor, the direct trust model, the indirect trust model, ways to update
the trust values, and how to utilize the trust values. The notations used in this
paper are summarized in Table I.
3.1. Dynamic Confidence Factor
Different from the existing literatures (such as [11]) that use a constant to
adjust the weight between the direct trust and the indirect trust, in this paper, we
define a dynamic confidence factor αi,j , which is given as
αi,j = f
(
NTi,j
)
, (2)
where f(·) is a function, and NTi,j denotes the number of direct transactions that
has been made between user i and user j at time T . For notation convenience, we
drop t in the discussion.
Basically, f(·) should have the following properties:
• ∀NTi,j ∈ [0,+∞), f(N
T
i,j) ∈ [0, 1].
• f(0) = 0, and limNT
i,j
→∞
f(NTi,j) = 1.
• f(NTi,j) is a monotonic increasing function of NTi,j .
Remark: (a). The first property guarantees that the value of the trust defined
in Equation (1) falls within the range [0, 1]. (b). The second property captures
the fact that when there is no direct transaction between user i and user j (i.e.,
NTi,j = 0), user i can only rely on the indirect trust values gathered from other
peers to determine its trust of user j (i.e., αi,j = 0). When the number of direct
transactions between user i and user j is sufficiently large, user i can ignore the
indirect trust. (c). The third property captures the fact that the confidence of user
i on its own judgement of the trustworthy of user j increases when the number of
direct transactions between them increases. (d). It is observed that these properties
of f(·) are similar to those of cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of random
variables [30]. Therefore, the design of f(·) can borrow ideas from the probability
theory.
In this paper, we propose two schemes that satisfy all the properties mentioned
above to design the confidence factor αi,j . The two designs are given as follows.
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Confidence Factor Design A (CFDA):
αi,j =
NTi,j
NTi,j + c
, (3)
where c is a positive constant. The value of c has a significant impact on αi,j .
For the same NTi,j , a larger c will result in a smaller αi,j , while a smaller c will
lead to a larger αi,j . In practice, c can be designed as a tunable parameter that
can be tuned by users. This is due to the fact that different peers have different
characteristics. Some peers are aggressive, and some peers are conservative. For
aggressive peers, they tend to be confidence with their own judgement after a few
transactions, and thus they can set a small value for c. For conservative peers, they
need more transactions to build up the confidence, and thus they can set a large
value for c.
Confidence Factor Design B (CFDB):
αi,j = 1− β
NT
i,j , (4)
where 0 < β < 1 is a constant. The value of β significantly affects the increasing
rate of αi,j . For the same NTi,j , a larger β results in a smaller αi,j , while a smaller
β leads to a larger αi,j . Similar as CFDA, β should be designed as a tunable
parameter that can be tuned by users. For aggressive peers, they can set a small
value for β; while for conservative peers, they can set a large value for β.
3.2. Direct Trust
Direct trust is the trust of a peer on another peer based on their direct inter-
acting experience. It is established only based on previous direct transactions
between peers. In a P2P streaming system, it is usually determined by two vari-
ables: the number of received clean chunks and the number of received polluted
chunks. Let N ci,j(t) and N
p
i,j(t) denote the total number of clean chunks and pol-
luted chunks that user i has received from user j at time t, the direct trust Di,j(t)
that user i has on user j at time t can be defined as
Di,j(t) = g
(
N ci,j(t), N
p
i,j(t)
)
, (5)
where g(·, ·) is a two-dimensional function. Basically, g(·, ·) should have the fol-
lowing properties:
• ∀N ci,j, N
p
i,j ∈ [0,+∞), g
(
N ci,j , N
p
i,j
)
∈ [0, 1].
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• g
(
N ci,j, N
p
i,j
)
is an increasing function of N ci,j , and is a decreasing function
of Npi,j .
In fact, there are already several direct trust models exiting in the literature. In
the following, we list two prevalent direct trust models.
Direct Trust Model A (DTMA):
Di,j(t) =
N ci,j(t)
N ci,j(t) +N
p
i,j(t)
. (6)
This model has been used in [11] and [26]. It represents the ratio of the number
of clean chunks vs the total number of chunks that user i has received from user
j. Another model is
Direct Trust Model B (DTMB):
Di,j(t) =
N ci,j(t) + 1
N ci,j(t) +N
p
i,j(t) + 2
. (7)
This model has been used in [24] and [26]. It is established based on beta-function.
It is observed that if a malicious peer sends clean and polluted chunks alter-
natively to the peers that request data from it, it can easily keep its trust value
above certain threshold if DTMA or DTMB is adopted. For example, if the mali-
cious peer performs the pollution attack by sending one polluted data chunk after
sending every two clean data chunks, it can keep its trust value above 0.5. In this
way, it can avoid not being detected as a polluter, and keep sending polluted data
chunks to the victims. This type of attack is referred to as on-off attack. This
indicates that DTMA and DTMB are vulnerable to the on-off attack. They cannot
be used alone, and must be used together with other techniques to fight against
the on-off attack. This inevitably increases the complexity and difficulty of the
system design. In this paper, we propose a novel way to model the direct trust,
which is resistant to the on-off attack.
Proposed Direct Trust Model (PDTM):
Di,j(t) = e
−ρN
p
i,j
(t)
N ci,j(t)
N ci,j(t) + η
, (8)
where ρ and η are positive constants, and e(·) is the exponential function. It is easy
to verify that the value of Di,j is within the range [0, 1], and Di,j is an increasing
function with regard to N ci,j and a decreasing function with regard to N
p
i,j . The
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value of the two parameters ρ and η has a great impact on the value of Di,j(t).
Therefore, how to set the value of ρ and η is of great importance to the perfor-
mance of PDTM. PDTM is rigorously proved to be resistant to the on-off attack
when ρ and η satisfy the condition ρ > ln(1 + 1
η
). The details and the proof are
given in Section 4.3.
3.3. Indirect Trust
Indirect trust is the trust of a peer on another peer obtained via third-party
peers’ recommendations. Indirect trust is very important when two peers have lit-
tle or no direct interactions. Indirect trust is established through trust propagation,
i.e., trustworthy peers are more likely to give honest feedbacks than distrusted
peers. Usually, indirect trust is determined by two key factors: the credibility of
the third-party peer and its recommendation value of the trustee.
Similar to [11], in this paper, we define the indirect trust as
Ii,j(t) ,
∑
k∈Si,j(t)
Ci,k(t)Rk,j(t)∑
k∈Si,j(t)
Ci,k(t)
, (9)
where Si,j(t) denotes the set of peers that have direct transactions with both peer
i and peer j. Ci,k(t) is the credibility of peer k, and Rk,j(t) is user k’s recommen-
dation value of user j based on their interaction experience.
In this paper, we design Ci,k(t) and Rk,j(t) as follows
Ci,k(t) = Di,k(t), (10)
Rk,j(t) = Dk,j(t), (11)
where Di,k(t) is the peer i’s direct trust on peer k, and Dk,j(t) is the peer k’s direct
trust on peer j. It is observed that k’s recommendation on peer j is weighted
proportionally by its own credibility. This design has two advantages. First, the
value of peer k’ recommendation on peer j can not be larger than its credibility.
This perfectly emulates human’s psychology, i.e., when a person establishes a
trust relationship with another person (referee) through a recommender, the trust
between the person and the referee is usually not as strong as that between the
person and the recommender. Second, peer k’ recommendation on peer j must be
based on its direct trust value of peer j. In this way, this makes the indirect trust
resilient to malicious peers who can manipulate their recommendations to cause
maximal damage to the network.
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3.4. Trust Updates
Intuitively, the recent interactions should have more weight than old interac-
tions in computing the trust value. In this paper, we assume that the interactions
made within the recent ∆t time have the same weight, and the weight of the inter-
actions made older than ∆t will experience certain attenuation. Mathematically,
the update functions can be written as
N ci,j(t
′) = e−λ∆tN ci,j(t) +
(
N ci,j(t
′)−N ci,j(t)
)
, (12)
Npi,j(t
′) = e−µ∆tNpi,j(t) +
(
Npi,j(t
′)−Npi,j(t)
)
, (13)
where λ and µ are positive constants, and t′ = t + ∆t. In this paper, we refer to
λ and µ as forgetting factor and forgiving factor, respectively. We request λ > µ,
which makes our trust management system remembers the unpleasant interactions
longer than the pleasant interactions.
We introduce the trust update functions due to the following three reasons.
Firstly, the forgetting property provides an incentive for peers to keep uploading
clean chunks to maintain or increase their trust values. If the trust computation
is only carried out in a cumulative manner without the forgetting property, a peer
will have diminishing incentives to behave honestly when it has established a
high trust value. This is due to the fact that the negative behaviors will play a
little role in changing the peer’s trust value at this time. However, if older trust
values is discounted with time, a peer’s recent behavior always matters and the
peer has continuing incentives to behave honestly to maintain or increase its trust
values. Secondly, the forgiving property allows good peers to wipe off their bad
transaction records caused by the bad network conditions. In practice, package
loss is inevitable when the network is congested. This will result in incomplete
data chunks. If a peer receives such kinds of data chunks, it will treat these data
chunks as polluted data chunks and reduce the trust value of the sender though the
sender is innocent. With the forgiving property, peers will forget these unpleasant
transactions. Finally, the forgiving property also gives a chance for the distrusted
peers to rejoin the network after a sufficient long waiting time during which they
may become good.
3.5. Utilizations of Trust Values
With the trust management system introduced in this section, peers can easily
compute the trust values of other peers. The trust values can then be used by
peers to identify polluters, and to determine whether to perform a transaction with
another peer. A conventional approach is to set up a trust threshold to differentiate
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polluters from good peers. For example, peer i can set up a threshold θi. If a
peer’s trust value is below θi, peer i identifies it as a polluter and will not perform
any further transactions with it. On the other hand, if a peer’s trust value is above
θi, peer i identifies it as a good peer and will perform the next transaction with
it. The value of the threshold can be different for different peers. This is due
to the fact that different peers may have different perception over the same trust
value. This approach is easy to implement. However, it has some deficiencies. For
example, if peer i sets a high value for θi, it will lose the opportunities to perform
transactions with peers whose low trust values are caused by previous bad network
conditions. On the other hand, if peer i sets a low value for θi, it may make the
trust management system vulnerable to potential pollution attacks. Therefore, in
this paper, we propose a double threshold approach to utilize the trust values.
Suppose peer i decides to make a transaction with peer j with probability
pi,j(t) at time t, then pi,j(t) can be determined by
pi,j(t) =


0, if Ti,j(t) < θPi ,
χi,j , if θPi ≤ Ti,j(t) < θGi ,
1, if Ti,j(t) ≥ θGi ,
(14)
where θPi and θGi are the thresholds for peer i to identify malicious and good peers,
respectively. If the trust value of peer j is below θPi , peer i will identify it as a
polluter and will not perform any further transactions with it; if the trust value of
peer j is larger than θGi , peer i will identify it as a good peer and will perform the
next transaction with it without hesitation. However, if the trust value of peer j
is between θPi and θGi , it is hard for peer i to judge whether peer j is a polluter
or a good peer experiencing bad network conditions. In this scenario, peer i will
perform the next transaction with peer j with probability χi,j . It is worth pointing
out that peer i can set different χi,j for different peer j, depending on the content
of the potential transaction. For example, peer i is willing to set a high value of
χi,j for a peer j that has data chunks which are closer to its playback time.
4. System Performance Analysis under Potential Attacks
In this subsection, we give an introduction of the commonly seen attacks in
P2P streaming networks, such as bad-mouthing attack [31], persistent attack [9,
10], on-off attack [11, 26], and collaborative attack [11, 26]. The performance of
the proposed trust management system are then investigated under these attacks.
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4.1. Bad-Mouthing Attack
Bad-Mouthing Attack [31] refers to the scenario that a single malicious peer
or a group of malicious peers deliberately provides negative recommendations to
frame up good peers. If there is only one malicious user, the negative effect of
the bad-mouthing attack is quite limited and thus can be ignored. This is due to
the fact that the indirect trust is obtained from the recommendations of a group
of peers, and a single peer’s malicious recommendation is not able to make a big
change of the indirect trust value. However, when a group of malicious peers
collude and give negative recommendations, the value of indirect trust will be
affected.
In our trust management system, the following two ways are adopted to fight
against bad-mouthing attacks.
a). Filtering out potential malicious recommendations. When computing the
indirect trust Ii,j(t), peer i only select the topK peers based on the value of Di,j(t)
from the set Si,j(t). By doing this, a peer can effectively avoid the malicious
recommendations from untrustworthy peers. The value of K can be determined
by each peer itself based on its own needs.
b). Reducing the weight of indirect trust. Bad-mouthing attacks are unavoid-
able as long as recommendations are taken into consideration. Therefore, reduc-
ing the weight of indirect trust in the trust computation is a good way to defend
against bad-mouthing attacks. The proposed two schemes to dynamically adjust
the confidence factor given in equations (3) and (4) can effectively reduce the
weight of indirect trust, and thus increase the trust management system’s resistant
to the bad-mouthing attack.
4.2. Persistent Attack
Persistent attack [9, 10] refers to the scenario that a malicious peer keeps send-
ing polluted chunks to the peers that request data from it. This kind of attacks is
very easy to handle when the number of malicious peers are not large. When a
malicious peer performs persistent attack, its trust value decreases fast. When its
trust value falls below the predetermined threshold, it can be easily detected as a
polluter, and will be prevented from further sharing of polluted data. However, if
there are a lot of malicious peers existing in the network, the conventional trust
management system may be not sufficient. This is because the trust value of a
malicious peer is inversely proportional to the polluted data chunks it sends out
in conventional trust management systems. Thus, it takes time for the trust value
of a malicious peer to drop below certain threshold. If a lot of malicious peers
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attack the victim at the same time, the victim may be not able to survive until it
can identify malicious peers.
The proposed trust management mechanism is effective in handling with this
type of attacks due to the following reasons. First, in our trust management mech-
anism, a peer will always send data request to those peers that have transactions
with it before, and select the top K peers based on the value of Di,j from these
peers. In this way, peers can reduce their exposure to malicious peers. Secondly,
in our trust management system, the trust value drops exponentially with respect
to the number of the polluted data chunks. As a result, the trust value of malicious
peers drops below the prescribed threshold within a few data chunks, and thus the
victim can identify the these malicious peers quickly.
4.3. On-Off Attack
On-off attack [11, 26] refers to the scenario that a malicious peer sends clean
and polluted chunks alternatively to the peers that request data from it. By doing
this, the malicious peer can keep its trust value above the predetermined threshold,
and thus avoid being identified as a polluter. The on-off attack exploits the fact that
most of the trust management mechanisms are designed to tolerate certain levels
of unintentionally polluted chunks (such as incomplete data chunks and erroneous
data chunks) due to bad network conditions.
To combat the on-off attack, an effective way is to design a trust management
system in which the dropping rate of trust value is larger than its increasing rate,
i.e., the trust value drops sharply when the peer uploads polluted chunks, and
accumulates slowly when the peer uploads the same number of clean chunks. If
a trust management mechanism satisfies this condition, we say it is resistant to
on-off attack.
Proposition 4.1: The proposed direct trust model given in (8) is resistant to
on-off attack when ρ > ln(1 + 1
η
).
Proof: Let the current trust value be Di,j(t). Suppose peer j continuously
uploads N polluted chunks to peer i in the following transaction, then the trust
value drop denoted by ∆Ddei,j(t) is
∆Ddei,j(t) = Di,j(t)− e
−ρ(Npi,j(t)+N)
N ci,j(t)
N ci,j(t) + η
=
(
e−ρN
p
i,j
(t)
− e−ρ(N
p
i,j
(t)+N)
) N ci,j(t)
N ci,j(t) + η
. (15)
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On the other hand, if peer j continuously uploads N clean chunks to peer i in the
following transaction, then the trust value increase denoted by ∆Dini,j(t) is
∆Dini,j(t) = e
−ρN
p
i,j
(t)
N ci,j(t) +N
N ci,j(t) +N + η
−Di,j(t)
= e−ρN
p
i,j
(t) ηN(
N ci,j(t) + η
) (
N ci,j(t) +N + η
) . (16)
The proposed trust management mechanism is resistant to on-off attack when
∆Ddei,j(t)/∆D
in
i,j(t) > 1. With equations given in (15) and (16), we have
∆Ddei,j(t)
∆Dini,j(t)
=
(
1− e−ρN
) N ci,j(t)
ηN
(
N ci,j(t) +N + η
)
≥
(
1− e−ρN
)
(η +N) . (17)
It is easy to verify that h(N) ,
(
1− e−ρN
)
(η +N) is an increasing function
with regard to N . Therefore, h(N) > 1, ∀N , if h(1) > 1, which is equivalent to
ρ > ln(1 + 1
η
). 
4.4. Collaborative Attack
Collaborative Attack [11, 26] refers to the scenario that a group of malicious
peers work together to strategically send polluted data chunks to the target peers.
A typical scenario is that one or some malicious peers in the group keep send-
ing polluted data chunks to the target peers, while others send valid data to gain
the trust of the target peers and give high recommendation trust values on these
malicious peers. The proposed trust management mechanism is quite effective in
defending against this kind of attacks due to the adoption of dynamic confidence
factor. This is due to the fact that the dynamic confidence factor can effectively
increase the weight of direct trust and reduce the weight of indirect trust with the
increasing of the number of transactions. When the number of transactions ex-
ceeds certain level, the trust value is dominated by direct trust, and the indirect
trust can be ignored.
A more advanced type of collaborative attacks is the scenario that a group
of malicious peers take turns to send polluted data chunks to the target peers,
and at the same time, they give high recommendations on each other. This type
of attack is a little complicated and is in general not easy to handle under the
conventional trust management mechanisms. However, due to the adoption of the
dynamic confidence factor and the proposed direct trust model, the proposed trust
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management mechanism is effective in fighting against this type of attack. The
individual behavior of each malicious peer in the group is actually same as that
of the on-off attack. The difference part is that these malicious peers give high
recommendation on each other. Through this way, they can increase the indirect
trust values of the attackers, consequently misleading the victims judgement on
the attackers. However, as mentioned before, the proposed dynamic confidence
factor can effectively reduce the weight of the indirect trust with increasing of the
number of transactions. When the number of transactions exceeds certain level,
the trust value will be dominated by the direct trust, and the indirect trust can be
ignored. On the other hand, as shown in Section 4.3, the proposed direct trust
model can effectively prevent the on-off attack. Therefore, with the combination
of these two components, the proposed trust management mechanism can easily
handle this type of collaborative attacks.
5. Simulation Results
In this section, several examples are provided to evaluate the performance of
the proposed studies. It is shown that the proposed trust management is quite
effective in fighting against various types of pollution attacks. In the simulations,
we consider a network with 10000 nodes. The network topology is generated by
BRITE [32], and is then imported to NS-2 [33] to do simulation. Without specific
declaration, we assume that CFDA with c = 1 is adopted to compute the dynamic
confidence factor. We assume η = 1, and ρ = ln(1 + 1
η
) for computing the direct
trust. The detailed simulation setup for each experiment is clearly described in
each individual example studied below.
5.1. Experiment 1: Constant Confidence Factor vs. Dynamic Confidence Factor
In this experiment, we let peer j keep uploading clean chunks to peer i. We as-
sume that peer j is under bad-mouthing attack, and some malicious peers give bad
recommendations on peer j for 80 percent of total transactions. Peer i computes
the trust values of peer j for 50 interactions based on the constant confidence fac-
tor scheme (CCFS) and our dynamic confidence factor scheme (DCFS), respec-
tively. For the CCFS, we assume that the confidence factor is 0.5. For the DCFS,
we adopt the CFDA proposed in Section 3. For fair comparison, we assume the
direct trust is computed by (6). It is seen from Fig. 2, the values of direct trust is
always equal to 1 since peer j keeps uploading clean chunks to peer i. While the
values of indirect trust is very low since j is suffering from bad-mouthing attack.
It is observed from Fig. 2 that the trust values of peer j obtained based on CCFS
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Figure 2: Constant confidence factor vs. dynamic confidence factor
deviate far from the true trust values, while the values obtained based on DCFS
are quite close to the true trust values. Besides, the difference between the trust
values computed based on DCFS and the the true trust values diminishes with the
increasing of the number of interactions. This example demonstrates the fact that
the proposed DCFS is quite effective in fighting against bad-mouthing attacks.
5.2. Experiment 2: Existing Direct Trust Models vs. Proposed Direct Trust Model
In this experiment, we let peer j perform on-off attacks on peer i. Three
different on-off ratios (50%, 20%, and 10%) are considered. When the attacker is
in “on” mode, it sends polluted data chunks to the target peer. When the attacker
is in “off” mode, it pretends to be a good peer, and sends clean data chunks to the
target peer. The on-off ratio denotes the ratio of the duration of the “on” mode
to the duration of the entire cycle. As explained before, DTMA and DTMB have
similar performance. Thus, in this part, we only compare the performance of
the proposed direct trust model with that of DTMA. The trust values of peer j
are computed for 50 interactions based on DTMA and PDTM, respectively. It is
observed from Fig. 3(a) that the dropping rates are much larger than the increasing
rate under PDTM. Therefore, the trust values obtained under PDTM are gradually
decreasing in the long run. It is observed that under the 50% on-off attack, the trust
value drops below 0.1 within 10 interactions. On the other hand, it is observed
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Figure 3: Existing direct trust models vs. proposed direct trust model
from Fig. 3(b) that the trust values computed under DTMA are maintained above
certain thresholds. For example, under the 20% on-off attack, the trust values of
the attacker are maintained above 0.8. Even under the 50% on-off attack, the trust
values of the attacker are maintained above 0.5, which indicates that DTMA is not
resistant to the on-off attack.
5.3. Experiment 3: Single Trust Threshold Scheme vs. Proposed Double Trust
Thresholds Scheme
In this experiment, we let 20% of the peers to be malicious. 10% of them
perform persistent attack, and the other 10% of them perform on-off attack with a
20% on-off ratio. Then, we observe the performance of peer i under different net-
work conditions using the two schemes, respectively. For the single trust threshold
scheme, we set the trust threshold of peer i as 0.8. For the proposed double trust
thresholds scheme, we adopt the following parameters: θPi = 0.5, θGi = 0.9, and
χi,j = 0.5, ∀j. It is observed from Fig. 4 that peers under the proposed scheme can
always achieve higher data rate as compared to the existing single trust threshold
scheme. This is due to the fact that the proposed scheme reduces the probability
of mistaking a good peer experiencing bad network conditions as a polluter. It is
also observed that the gap between the proposed scheme and the single threshold
scheme increases when the network conditions become worse. This is because
when the network conditions become worse, the trust value of more peers are af-
fected, and thus these peers are regarded as malicious peers by the conventional
single trust threshold scheme. On the other side, the proposed scheme allows peer
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Figure 4: Single Trust Threshold vs. Proposed Double Trust Thresholds
i to perform transactions with these peers with certain probability, and thus results
in a higher data rate.
5.4. Experiment 4: Performance under collaborative attack
In this experiment, we assume there are 10 malicious peers carrying out col-
laborative attack. One of them is chosen to keep sending polluted data chunks to
the target peer, while the remaining peers send clean data chunks and give high
recommendation to the malicious peer that is chosen to send polluted data chunks.
The trust values of the malicious peer sending polluted data chunks and a mali-
cious peers sending clean data chunks are plotted in Fig. 5. It is observed that
the trust values of the malicious peer sending polluted data drops quickly with the
increasing of the number of the interactions. This is as expected since that the
dynamic confidence factor can effectively reduce the weight of indirect trust with
the increasing of the number of transactions. When the number of transactions
exceeds certain level, the trust value is dominated by direct trust. The trust value
of the malicious peer that sends clean data chunks is increasing, since there is
no punishment mechanism to prevent peers from giving misleading recommenda-
tions in our system. Actually, it is not necessary since the target peer can identify
the malicious peer that is sending polluted data chunks, and reject receiving data
from it. At the same time, it can also benefit from receiving clean data chunks
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from those malicious peers that pretend to be good peers.
In Fig. 6, we investigate the performance of the proposed trust management
mechanism under the advanced collaborative attack where malicious peers take
turns to attack a target peer. Two scenarios are considered here. Scenario A
considerers that 10 peers collude and take turns to attack a target peer. While
scenario B considers a group size of 5. It is observed from the figure that the
trust values of the malicious peer in scenario A drop slowly than those of the
malicious peer in scenario B. This is due to the fact that malicious peers in scenario
B attacks the target peer more frequently. In scenario B, each malicious peer sends
a polluted data chunk to the target peer after sending four clean data chunks, which
is similar as the on-off attack with a on-off ratio of 20%. While in scenario A, each
malicious peer sends one polluted data chunk to the target peer after sending nine
clean data chunks, which is similar as the on-off attack with a on-off ratio of 10%.
This indicates that the group size of the collaborative attack matters. Collaborative
attacks with a larger group size are more harmful than those with a smaller group
size.
Besides, comparing scenario A with the 10% on-off attack scenario given in
Fig. 3(a), it is observed that the trust values of the malicious peer in scenario A
drop slowly than those of the malicious carrying out 10% on-off attack, especially
during the first 30 interactions. This is due to the fact that in scenario A, the indi-
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Figure 6: Performance under advanced collaborative attack where malicious peers in the group
take turns to attack a target peer
rect trust value of the attacker is high since other malicious peers in the group keep
giving high recommendations on the attacker. Thus, the trust value of the attacker
drops slow than that of the 10% on-off attack. However, with the increasing of
the number of interactions, the effect of the indirect trust on the trust computation
decreases due to the role of the dynamic confidence factor. Thus, the gap between
the two cases gradually diminishes.
5.5. Experiment 5: The effect of trust values on the number of data requests
In this experiment, we run our algorithm by implementing an event-driven
script on the real-world testbed PlanetLab [34]. We observe the number of data
requests at 100 peers with different trust values. The trust values of these peers is
computed by a new peer that just joins the network and does not have any interac-
tions with others. It is observed from Fig. 7 that the peers with large trust values
in general receive more data requests than peers with low trust values. The peers
with trust values lower than 0.5 receive much less data requests. This indicates
that the proposed trust management mechanism is quite effective in reducing the
peers exposure to potential malicious peers. On the other hand, it is observed that
the peers with low trust values can still attract some data requests. These data
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requests come from the new peers that just join the network. This is due to the
fact that when these peers join the network, they do not have any interactions with
other peers. The indirect trust plays a dominate role in computing the trust of other
peers. Thus, these new peers are more vulnerable to malicious attacks. They may
send data requests to those peers with low trust values if they receive misleading
recommendations.
5.6. Experiment 6: Performance comparison between the proposed trust manage-
ment system and PeerTrust
In this experiment, we compare the performance of the proposed trust man-
agement system with that of the existing PeerTrust given in [22]. For our scheme,
we use the same simulation parameters as in example 3. For each scenario, we
let half of the malicious peers perform persistent attack, and half of the malicious
peers perform on-off attack with a 20% on-off ratio. The network condition is
emulated by randomly adding a packet loss rate between 0% and 2% at each peer.
It is observed from Fig. 8 that when there is no malicious peers in the network,
the proposed trust management system performs the same as PeerTrust. However,
with the increasing of percentage of malicious nodes, the advantages of the pro-
posed trust management system become evident. This is as expected since the
proposed trust management system takes the features of pollution attack and the
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network conditions into consideration when it is designed, while PeerTrust does
not.
6. Discussion and Future Work
6.1. Secure Transmission of Indirect Trust Values
Due to the distributed nature of P2P multimedia streaming networks, the unau-
thorized manipulation of indirect trust values can happen during the transmission.
Thus, it is very important to guarantee secrecy and integrity of the trust data. This
can be achieved by a PKI-based (Public Key Infrastructure) [35] scheme. When
a peer i wants to evaluate the trustworthiness of peer j, it initiates an enquiry on
the indirect trust value of peer j, and sends its public key together with the en-
quiry. Then, the peers who have transaction experience with peer j, encrypt their
responses with peer i’s public key and sign the responses with their own private
keys. Then, these peers sends the signed encrypted responses to peer i together
with their public keys. Upon receiving these responses, peer i verifies their signa-
tures with the attached public keys and decrypts the responses with its own private
key. The fact that the responses are signed with the responding peers’ private keys
allows the detection of integrity violations of the trust values and the authenticity
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of their origins. The fact that the trust values are encrypted with peer i’s public
key guarantee the confidentiality of the trust data transmission.
6.2. Joint Design of Trust Management and Incentive Mechanisms
Indirect trust plays a significant role in computing the trust value of a target
peer when a peer does not have much interactions with the target peer. However,
without effective incentive mechanisms, peers have no incentive to cooperate with
each other, and thus the trust records based on other peers’ recommendations can-
not be quickly established. Therefore, effective incentive mechanisms [36, 37]
are crucial for the successful implementation of the proposed trust management
mechanism. On the other hand, trust management mechanism are very important
for P2P streaming systems with incentive mechanisms. Without effective mea-
sures to identify malicious peers, the polluted data chunks could be disseminated
to the whole network more quickly in a P2P network with incentive mechanisms
than that without incentive mechanisms. This is due to the fact that peers are mo-
tivated to upload data chunks to each other to earn points or monetary rewards
in a P2P system with incentive mechanisms. Without the ability to identify mali-
cious peers, peers are more likely to forward polluted data chunks, consequently
degrading the performance of the system. Therefore, trust management and in-
centive mechanisms should be jointly designed to defend against both malicious
attacks and selfish users. We leave this as our future work.
6.3. Tuning of the Parameters
In the proposed trust model presented in this paper, there are a lot of tunable
parameters. The value of these parameters plays a significant role in the effective-
ness of the proposed trust model. Thus, how to optimally choose the values of
these parameters is of great importance. In this paper, we deign these parameters
as tunable parameters and let the users decide these parameters based on their own
benefits. This is due to the fact that different users have different requirement. It is
clear that this design offers great degree of freedom, and benefits each individual
peer. From the perspective of the whole P2P community, this may not be optimal.
Besides, the value of these parameters may have an impact on the network topol-
ogy resilience, the streaming quality, and the network awareness [38]. Thus, how
to choose these parameters such that the performance of the whole community
can be optimized needs to be investigated. We leave this as our future work.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, a trust management system to fight against various kinds of pol-
lution attacks for P2P multimedia streaming systems are proposed by exploring
the unique features of pollution attacks. A dynamic confidence factor is proposed
to dynamically adjust the weight of direct and indirect trust in computing the trust,
which is shown to be pretty effective in fighting against the bad-mouthing attack.
Guidelines on how to deign such a dynamic confidence factor are given, and two
specific designs of the dynamic confidence factor are proposed. Besides, a new
direct trust model that is proved to be resistant to the on-off pollution attack is
proposed and investigated. The performance of the proposed trust management
mechanism under various types of pollution attacks is then investigated. Finally,
several numerical examples are presented, which show the superiority of the pro-
posed trust management system.
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